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To achieve fairness and accuracy, an income tax system must
accomplish two objectives: allow depreciation deductions for the erosion
in the value of assets used to produce income, and correct errors that may
result from excessive depreciation allowances. The Internal Revenue Code
currently fares well in accomplishing the first objective but conspicuously
fails to achieve the second.
One of the two main depreciation corrective mechanisms is embodied
in Internal Revenue Code § 1250. This section requires that upon the
disposition of depreciable real estate used in a trade or business, a portion
of the gain that reflects the taxpayer’s prior depreciation deductions must
be treated as ordinary income or, in tax parlance, “recaptured.”
Recapturing gain as ordinary income is consistent with the treatment of
depreciation itself, which allows ordinary deductions over the period
during which the asset was used to produce income.
The problem is that § 1250 is seriously flawed. When it was initially
enacted, it corrected some excessive depreciation allowances; however,
under current law, it rarely applies at all. Taxpayers are thus able to
achieve significant tax arbitrage windfalls: by taking generous
depreciation deductions, they can shelter income subject to high ordinary
tax rates while recognizing subsequent gains produced by those deductions
at preferential capital gains rates.
The reform that this analysis calls for is remarkably simple: Congress
should repeal § 1250 and uniformly apply the more accurate recapture
rules of § 1245—which currently applies only to assets other than real
estate—to all depreciable assets. Uniform depreciation recapture rules
would produce a more coherent tax regime, fostering fairness, efficiency,
and accuracy.
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Unifying Depreciation Recapture
RICHARD L. SCHMALBECK* & JAY A. SOLED**
I. INTRODUCTION
From its inception, one of the central features of our income tax system
has been an allowance for depreciation deductions for property used in a
trade or business or for the production of income.1 Such allowances are
necessary to reflect income accurately: as assets are used to produce
income, they generally diminish in value over time. Taxpayers should be
able to account for these declines with depreciation deductions against
profits.2
But depreciation deductions are inevitably speculative in the sense that
until a taxpayer sells or otherwise disposes of an asset, there can be no
certainty about the precise amount its value has eroded over time. Upon
disposition, precision can be achieved: the amount realized can be
compared to the taxpayer’s initial investment in the asset. The difference is
the actual erosion in the asset’s value, and this number can be compared
with the total of depreciation deductions allowed.
If the depreciation allowed is understated, a loss will result.3 In
*
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1
Since 1909, a depreciation deduction has been associated with the federal income tax system.
See Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act of 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 113 (providing that net income includes
a reasonable allowance for depreciation of property deductions). For an excellent historic overview of
depreciation deductions, see Henry J. Lischer, Jr., Depreciation Policy: Whither Thou Goest, 32 SW.
L.J. 545, 546–71 (1978).
2
See United States v. Ludey, 274 U.S. 295, 300 (1927) (“The depreciation charge permitted as a
deduction from the gross income in determining the taxable income of a business for any year
represents the reduction, during the year, of the capital assets through wear and tear of the plant
used.”); see also MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN & LAWRENCE A. ZELENAK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
187 (12th ed. 2012) (noting that a conceptual approach to depreciation would be to allow a deduction
for the amount by which the asset declined in value by the end of the year); Yoram Margalioth, Not a
Panacea for Economic Growth: The Case of Accelerated Depreciation, 26 VA. TAX REV. 493, 503
(2007) (“Economic analysis views investment in depreciable assets, such as machines, like any other
investment. . . . The annual depreciation is the difference between the present value of expected cash
flow from the asset at the start of each year and the present value of the expected cash flow at the end
of each year.”); Anthony P. Polito, Fiddlers on the Tax: Depreciation of Antique Instruments Invites
Reexamination of Broader Tax Policy, 13 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 87, 93 (1996) (“The historic concept of
the depreciation regime was justifiable as increasing the degree to which taxable income clearly reflects
economic income.”).
3
The Internal Revenue Code requires recognition of gain, and allows recognition of loss, upon
the “sale or other disposition” of assets. I.R.C. § 1001 (2012). The prescribed computation consists of
**
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general, such losses are deductible against ordinary income, as they should
be, because they represent costs of generating profits that the tax
accounting rules had not previously recognized.4 Conversely, if the
depreciation deduction allowed is overstated, a gain will result. Such gains
have typically been treated favorably under the Internal Revenue Code
(“the Code”),5 principally through lower tax rates applicable to such gains.
This combination of ordinary deductions and subsequent capital gains
creates an extraordinary—and unjustified—benefit to taxpayers.
Approximately half a century ago, when Congress introduced § 1250
into the Code, it purported to tackle this problem. In order to foster equity
in the income tax,6 Congress declared the following: upon the sale or
exchange of depreciable real property (primarily buildings used in a trade
or business), all or a portion of the gain attributable to prior depreciation
deductions—which gave rise to ordinary income tax deductions—would be
treated as ordinary income rather than as capital gains and, accordingly,
would not warrant preferential capital gains tax rate treatment.7
Unfortunately, this rule initially applied to only a portion of the gain, not to
all of it,8 and currently has virtually no application at all.
To illustrate by example, in one of the rare situations in which § 1250
still applies, suppose that on January 1, 2015, a taxpayer in the highest
marginal income tax bracket (currently, 39.6%) purchases a $1,000,000
residential rental real estate building and subsequently sells this real estate
subtracting the taxpayer’s adjusted basis from the amount realized. Id. § 1001(a). In most cases, the
adjusted basis is the original cost of the asset minus depreciation deductions allowable over the course
of its use. Thus, if upon disposition the adjusted basis is larger than the amount realized, it will mean
that the depreciation deductions allowable over time understated the erosion in value in the asset.
Subtracting that adjusted basis from the amount realized will produce a negative number, which is the
measure of the loss the taxpayer sustained over the period of the asset’s use.
4
I.R.C. § 1231 applies to assets held for more than one year that are used in a trade or business,
and allows net gains from the disposition of such assets in any tax year to be treated as long-term
capital gains, but allows net losses from the disposition of such assets to be treated as losses that are
fully deductible against ordinary business income. I.R.C. § 1231(a)(1)–(2) (2012).
5
26 U.S.C. §§ 1–8023 (2012). Unless otherwise indicated, all provisions mentioned in this Essay
refer to the Internal Revenue Code.
6
See Hoffman F. Fuller, The Recapture of Depreciation, 39 TUL. L. REV. 15, 20–21, 33–34
(1964) (explaining how §§ 1245 and 1250 were enacted “to reform . . . the relationship between
depreciation deductions and the tax effects to the property owner resulting from subsequent disposition
of the depreciated property”); Selwyn A. Horvitz, Sections 1250 and 1245: The Puddle and the Lake,
20 TAX L. REV. 285, 285–92 (1965) (noting that §§ 1245 and 1250 were enacted to close an income tax
loophole by recapturing depreciation); Edwin L. Kahn, Recapture of Depreciation, 42 TAXES 918, 922
(1964) (commenting that §§ 1245 and 1250 have addressed the problem of overgenerous property
depreciation deductions).
7
I.R.C. § 1250(a)(1)(A) (2012).
8
When first enacted, § 1250 applied only to the difference between straight-line and accelerated
depreciation, and even this amount was reduced by one percent for each month over twenty months that
the property was held, so that after ten years or 120 months, no income was recaptured. See I.R.C. §
1250(a)(2) (1964).
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on December 31, 2015 for $1,000,000. On his tax return, the taxpayer
would be allowed $36,363 of depreciation deductions;9 furthermore, the
taxpayer would also have to report $36,363 of gain (i.e., $1,000,000
amount realized less $963,637 adjusted tax basis). In the parlance of the
Code, because title to the property was held for one year or less, the
character of this gain would be § 1250 recapture income taxable as
ordinary income.10 The symmetrical nature of the deduction and income
characterization makes sense: the depreciation deduction would yield
$14,400 in tax savings ($36,363 x .396). Such tax savings, however, would
be offset dollar for dollar by the subsequent recognition event, yielding an
additional $14,400 of taxes ($36,363 x .396).
This sensible result is also an exceedingly unusual result. This is
because § 1250 works in this fashion only in the rare case in which the real
estate asset is bought and sold within a one-year time period. In the far
more common situation in which title to real property is held for more than
one year, § 1250 usually fails to recapture any of the excess depreciation
deductions allowed at ordinary rates.
A second example illustrates the more common case: suppose that a
taxpayer purchases a $1,000,000 residential rental estate building on
January 1, 2015, but this time the taxpayer holds the property for two years
before selling it for $1,000,000 on December 31, 2016. In both 2015 and
2016, the taxpayer would be entitled to take $36,363 of depreciation
deductions,11 yielding total tax savings of $28,800 (($36,363 x 2) x .396).
On his 2016 tax return, the taxpayer would have to report a resulting
$72,726 gain ($1,000,000 amount realized less $927,274 adjusted tax
basis). Because title to the property was held more than one year, the
character of this gain would be “[u]nrecaptured section 1250 gain,”12 one
of several types of capital gains income for which special (and lower) tax
rates are imposed.13 In this particular example, the capital gains tax rate is
25%.14 This income characterization thus produces a tax burden of only
$18,181.50 ($72,726 x .25).15
An ideal recapture provision would tax the resulting gain at a rate that
would produce the same amount of tax as the excess depreciation
deductions had saved. This example demonstrates the shortcomings of
9
I.R.C. § 168(b)(3)(B), (c), (d)(2)(B) (2012). For simplicity, this example ignores the mid-month
convention mandated by I.R.C. § 168(d)(2)(B).
10
Id. § 1250(b)(1).
11
This second example again ignores the application of the mid-month convention.
12
I.R.C. § 1(h)(6) (2012) (emphasis added).
13
Id.
14
Id. § 1(h)(1)(E). In some cases, depending largely on the aggregate amount of the taxpayer’s
income, an additional 3.8% tax on net investment income under I.R.C. § 1411 may apply.
15
Had the resultant gain instead been treated as ordinary income, the taxpayer would have
experienced a $28,800 tax burden ($72,726 x .396). See I.R.C. § 1 for the Code’s tax schedule.
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§ 1250: the taxpayer saved $28,800 through the depreciation deductions
that are now known to have been unnecessary in view of the fact that the
asset lost no value at all; and yet when those deductions are recaptured,
only $18,181.50 is collected. Indeed, over time, the taxpayer’s taxarbitrage profits grow more robust (although the percentage of tax savings
remains constant).16 Thus, § 1250 falls well short of its supposed goal of
correcting inappropriate tax savings associated with excessive depreciation
deductions.17
This analysis explores § 1250, explains its many flaws, and proposes
its repeal. It proceeds as follows: Part II provides a short historical
background of what led Congress to enact § 1250 and how, over time, it
has evolved. Part III details the ways in which § 1250 violates several
important tax principles, draws arbitrary property distinctions, and favors
high-income taxpayers at the expense of low-income taxpayers. In light of
§ 1250’s evident shortcomings, Part IV explains why including real estate
within the ambit of § 1245—the Code’s recapture bulwark that generally
applies to non-real estate depreciable property18—is preferable to retaining
§ 1250. Finally, Part V offers our conclusions.
II. SECTION 1250: ITS ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION
To understand § 1250 and its flaws requires some knowledge of its
history. We divide this history into the following three successive
chronological segments: (A) judicial response to the character inequity
problem; (B) legislative solution to the character inequity problem; and (C)
evolution of § 1250 from its enactment to its current status.
A. Judicial Response to the Character Inequity Problem
Until 1962, the Code contained no provisions regarding depreciation
recapture. This allowed egregious inequity as taxpayers readily
transformed depreciation allowances that gave rise to ordinary income tax
deductions into capital gains. During these years, this alchemy involving
character transformation was not difficult to accomplish.
For most of the years during the pre-recapture period, taxpayers
claiming depreciation deductions had to estimate how long they would use
a business asset (the “useful life” of the asset) and for what value they
16
Indeed, had the building been fully depreciated, per § 1250(a)(1)(B), it would have produced
$396,000 of tax savings ($1,000,000 x .396) and subsequently sold for $1,000,000, and the tax due
would have been $250,000 ($1,000,000 gain x .25). The $146,000 difference between these two
amounts ($396,000 – $250,000) reflects a 37% savings, which constitutes a pure, after-tax windfall to
the taxpayer.
17
See sources cited supra note 6 (explaining the general function of § 1250 and the congressional
intent behind it).
18
I.R.C. § 1245(a)(3) (2012).
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might be able to sell that asset at the conclusion of its use (the “salvage
value” of the asset).19 In an ideal tax system, depreciation deductions
would be intended to measure an asset’s true economic decline in value,
and thereby foster accurate reporting of business income.20 But even wellintentioned taxpayers could make mistakes about how long they would use
assets and/or their salvage values. Additionally, economic forces (e.g., a
sudden metal shortage or surge in availability) could cause assets’ fair
market values to either skyrocket or drop precipitously.21
These factors could and sometimes did produce significant variation
between depreciation deductions claimed and the amounts that,
retrospectively, would have reflected an asset’s true economic decline in
value. Consider, for example, a taxpayer who purchased a $1,000 piece of
machinery, with an estimated five-year useful life and zero-dollar salvage
value. Over the course of the ensuing five-year period, assume that the
taxpayer took $200 of annual depreciation deductions. Over those five
years,22 as a result of taking these depreciation deductions, the taxpayer
could shelter $1,000 of income, producing $400 of tax savings (assuming a
40% effective tax rate on ordinary income). At the end of Year 5, for one
or more reasons—the machine’s useful life proved longer than anticipated,
its salvage value was higher than expected, and/or there was a machine
shortage—the machinery sold for $1,000. This sale would produce a
$1,000 gain (i.e., $1,000 amount realized with a zero-dollar adjusted tax
basis), triggering a $200 corresponding tax burden (assuming a 20%
preferential tax rate on capital gains). With respect to this asset purchase,
the taxpayer was able to achieve $400 in tax savings at the price of only a
$200 tax burden.
The resulting $200 subsidy that was accorded from the U.S.
government to the taxpayer was obvious to anyone, including judges who
heard cases involving depreciation disputes. Those judges could have
simply noted the inequity and concluded that it was up to Congress to craft
a remedy. However, some courts saw at least one opportunity to lessen—
19
See Massey Motors, Inc. v. United States, 364 U.S. 92, 97, 102–03 (1960) (explaining that,
prior to Congress’s instituting accelerated cost-recovery systems in 1954, taxpayers could depreciate
property based upon how long they intended to use such property rather than over the property’s useful
life).
20
See, e.g., United States v. Ludey, 274 U.S. 295, 300–01 (1927) (“The amount of the allowance
for depreciation is the sum which should be set aside for the taxable year, in order that, at the end of the
useful life of the [asset] in the business, the aggregate of the sums set aside will (with the salvage
value) suffice to provide an amount equal to the original cost.”).
21
See, e.g., Fribourg Navigation Co. v. Comm’r, 383 U.S. 272, 274 (1966) (discussing the change
in a ship’s fair market value after the 1956 Suez crisis and holding that, notwithstanding the change, the
taxpayer was still allowed to take depreciation deductions).
22
Because we are describing here a basic fact pattern that prevailed over a variety of tax years
and tax rules, we are using abstract parameters that do not necessarily reflect accurately any particular
set of depreciation provisions or tax rates.
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albeit only slightly—this inequitable outcome, and seized upon it.
The basic amelioration strategy consisted simply of disallowing
depreciation deductions in the year of the sale of an asset, to the extent that
the sales price exceeded the asset’s putative salvage value.23 To illustrate,
in the prior example, since the $1,000 sales price exceeded the putative
zero-dollar salvage value by $1,000, the $200 depreciation deduction
associated with the last year of asset ownership would be disallowed in its
entirety. By disallowing the asset’s depreciation deduction for its last year
of service, courts were able to reduce the government’s subsidy to the
taxpayer, but only to the extent of the tax benefits obtained in the final year
of the asset’s use.
In addition to its limited scope, this judicial solution—eponymously
referred to as the “Cohn Rule” after the case that inaugurated it—suffered
from other shortcomings.24 First, not all courts subscribed to even this
limited response to the arbitrage problem.25 In addition, in the absence of
specific statutory grounding, this rule was never incorporated into the
routine reporting by taxpayers who were not audited; thus, it was only
applied in select cases.
By the early sixties, both the White House and Congress recognized
that there was a serious problem inherent in an income system that
permitted depreciation allowances, yet contained no associated corrective
mechanisms when these allowances proved too generous.26 While well
intentioned, the judiciary’s half-baked solution, grounded on tenuous

23
See, e.g., Rouse v. Comm’r, 39 T.C. 70, 78 (1962), acq., 1963-2 C.B. 5; Lane v. Comm’r, 37
T.C. 188, 194–95 (1961); Weir Long Leaf Lumber Co. v. Comm’r, 9 T.C. 990, 1003 (1947), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part, 173 F.2d 549, 553 (5th Cir. 1949), acq., 1948-1 C.B. 3.
24
See Cohn v. United States, 259 F.2d 371, 377–78 (6th Cir. 1958) (“[W]here at the end of any
taxable year there is a clear and convincing basis, in the light of facts reasonably known to exist at the
time, for making a redetermination of the remaining useful life of the asset, such a redetermination may
be made. If a redetermination is made, the depreciation is not modified for prior years, but the
remaining depreciated cost is spread ratably over the new estimated remaining useful life and
depreciation reductions taken accordingly for the current and succeeding years.”); see also Rouse, 39
T.C. at 77–78 (refusing to disallow depreciation deductions incurred in earlier tax years); Rev. Rul. 6292, 1962-1 C.B. 29, 31 (“[T]he deduction for depreciation of an asset used in the trade or business or in
the production of income shall be adjusted in the year of disposition so that the deduction, otherwise
properly allowable for such year under the taxpayer’s method of accounting for depreciation, is limited
to the amount, if any, by which the adjusted basis of the property at the beginning of such year exceeds
the amount realized from sale or exchange.” (emphasis added)).
25
Those taxpayers who used an accelerated depreciation method (e.g., double-declining balance)
and whose depreciation deductions were correspondingly smaller in later years, fared much better
under the Cohn Rule than those taxpayers who elected to use a slower depreciation method (e.g.,
straight-line method) and thus had correspondingly larger depreciation deductions in later years.
26
See Horvitz, supra note 6, at 289 (“Having seen the problems of applying the judicial and
administrative approaches, President Kennedy, on April 20, 1961, recommended legislation to
eliminate the possibility of converting a depreciation deduction into a capital gain.”).

2015]

UNIFYING DEPRECIATION RECAPTURE

539

27

statutory and regulatory footing, was not a long-term fix to the ubiquitous
problem of excessive depreciation allowances. Meaningful reform, if it
were to happen, would have to happen in the form of legislation.
B. Legislative Solution to the Character Inequity Problem
Congress took its cue and responded first in 196228 with the
introduction of § 1245 (generally, applicable to personal property)29 and
then in 1964 with the introduction of § 1250 (generally, applicable to real
property).30
The objective of these related sections was to curtail taxpayers’ ability
to convert ordinary deductions into capital gains.31 More specifically, they
operated to “recapture” prior depreciation deductions as ordinary income
rather than allowing taxpayers to treat such income as capital gains.
Sections 1245 and 1250, however, differed significantly in scope and
application.
Section 1245 operates with admirable directness to convert excess
depreciation deductions into ordinary income. Upon the disposition of
personal property, the amount of “recapture income” treated as ordinary
income is, in virtually all cases, equal to the lesser of two computations:
the initial purchase price, less the adjusted basis of the asset; or the amount
realized upon the sale or disposition, less the adjusted basis in the asset.32
This amount will be precisely the amount of excess depreciation claimed
over the taxpayer’s use of the asset.
For example, if an asset had been purchased for $10,000, and sold at a
time when depreciation deductions had reduced its basis to $6,000, a sale
at a price of $7,500 would produce recapture under the second
computational rule above: $7,500 – $6,000, or $1,500, which is the exact
amount of the excess depreciation claimed. A sale at a price of $12,000
27
See Treas. Reg. § 1.167(c) (1956) (implying that unless the taxpayer redetermined an asset’s
useful life, its salvage value should remain constant).
28
There was one, very limited, earlier effort. The legislative precursor to both §§ 1245 and 1250
is § 1238, which required ordinary income recapture pertaining to accelerated deductions for
emergency facilities to be subsequently sold at a gain. It was originally enacted as I.R.C. § 117(g)(3) of
the 1939 Code, added by the Revenue Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-814, § 216, 64 Stat. 906, 939.
29
Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, § 13, 76 Stat. 960, 1032.
30
Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 231, 78 Stat. 19, 100.
31
In campaigning for reform in the hearings on the Revenue Act of 1962 before the Senate
Committee on Finance, Treasury Secretary Dillon observed that “the excess depreciation, having been
charged against income taxable at ordinary rates, is recouped and taxed only as capital gains.” An Act to
Amend the Revenue Act of 1954 to Provide a Credit for Investment in Certain Depreciable Property, to
Eliminate Certain Defects and Inequities, and for Other Purposes: Hearing on H.R. 10650 Before the
S. Comm. on Fin., 87th Cong. 88 (1962) [hereinafter 1962 Senate Hearings] (statement of Hon.
Douglas Dillon, Secretary of the Treasury).
32
See I.R.C. § 1245(a)(1) (2012) (providing statutory guidelines for calculating the amount of
recapture income that can be treated as ordinary income).
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would produce recapture under the first computational rule: $10,000 –
$6,000, or $4,000, which is, again, the exact amount of the excess
depreciation claimed.
In contrast, § 1250 is a halfhearted measure—and a conceptual mess. It
disregards the basic principle of depreciation recapture, which is to prevent
conversion of ordinary income into capital gain. Instead, it treats as
recapture income only those depreciation deductions that were in excess of
what the straight-line depreciation method would have produced. The
balance is treated as § 1231 gain, which is generally categorized as capital
gain and subject to preferential tax rates.33
It appears that Congress adopted the halfhearted approach of § 1250
largely because it was persuaded to do so by the powerful real estate lobby.
This lobbying group argued that real estate had distinctive characteristics
that required unique tax treatment.34 One such distinguishing characteristic
is that real estate, unlike other assets used in a trade or business, generally
appreciates in value;35 and, as such, it is vulnerable to the so-called lock-in
effect,36 which reflects the tax disincentive to realize taxable gains.37
Because taxpayers ultimately have complete control over the timing of
realization events, the greater the potential tax exposure, the greater the
disincentive to realize gains. Obviously, applying the rules of § 1245 to
real estate gains would increase the amount of tax paid on realized gains
and thus unambiguously exacerbate the lock-in effect. In congressional
circles, this argument apparently carried great weight, as § 1250’s
legislative history echoes with this concern, signifying that the real estate

33
Recall that if § 1250 property is held for one year or less, the entire gain is treated as recapture
income. See id. § 1250(b)(1).
34
Charles S. Franklin, Real Property Depreciation Recapture: An Ineffectual Reform of the Tax
Laws, 19 VAND. L. REV. 1336, 1355 (1966) (“The National Association of Homebuilders, ‘the sole
national spokesman of the homebuilding industry in the United States,’ exerted substantial efforts at the
1962 and 1963 congressional hearings to defeat first, and successfully, the original Treasury proposal
and then, unsuccessfully, the House version later enacted as [§] 1250.” (footnotes omitted)).
35
See S. REP. NO. 87-1881, at 95 (1962) (describing the reasoning behind Congress’s decision not
to apply § 1245 to buildings).
36
See 1962 Senate Hearings, supra note 31, at 3554, 3556–58 (statement of Emil Gould,
Chairman, Tax Studies Comm., Nat’l Ass’n of Homebuilders) (describing the tendency of real estate to
appreciate in value and the corresponding danger of the lock-in effect).
37
See Richard L. Schmalbeck, The Uneasy Case for a Lower Capital Gains Tax: Why Not the
Second Best?, 48 TAX NOTES 195, 200–01 (1990) (describing the lock-in effect as “the tax-induced
reluctance to dispose of assets” caused by “the combined effects of a realization requirement and a
relatively high tax on realized gains”); Walter J. Blum, A Handy Summary of the Capital Gains
Arguments, 35 TAXES 247, 256–58 (1957) (arguing that § 1250 discourages real estate investors from
realizing capital gains due to its tax treatment of real property); Noël B. Cunningham & Deborah H.
Schenk, The Case for a Capital Gains Preference, 48 TAX L. REV. 319, 344–46 (1993) (“The lock-in
effect describes an investor’s reluctance to incur a tax on realization of gains. . . . An investor who is
not taxed until realization and who can avoid tax . . . tends not to change investments, even though he
may believe that higher returns are available elsewhere.”).

2015]

UNIFYING DEPRECIATION RECAPTURE

541

lobby was instrumental in shaping the watered-down legislative outcome.38
Because of their structural design differences, §§ 1245 and 1250
produce strikingly different tax outcomes. Consider the situation of a
taxpayer who, in 1964, purchases and places into service a piece of
machinery and a building, each for $100,000. To enable direct comparison,
we assume that the machinery and the building each have a ten-year useful
life, that taxpayer employed a 200% declining-balance depreciation
method, and that neither the mid-year nor mid-month convention applies.
The following table illustrates the taxpayer’s depreciation deductions for
each asset as well as each asset’s adjusted tax basis at year’s end:

Year
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
Total

Actual
Depreciation
$20,000
16,000
12,800
10,240
8,192
$67,232

StraightLine
Depreciation
$10,000
10,000
10,000
10,000
10,000
$50,000

Excess of
Actual over
Straight Line
$10,000
6,000
2,800
240
(1,808)
$17,232

Adjusted
Tax
Basis
$80,000
64,000
51,200
40,960
$32,768

Suppose that at the end of 1968, the taxpayer sold both the machinery
and the building for $100,000. The resulting gains would be as follows:
Property
Amount Realized
Less Adjusted Basis ($100,000
cost less $67,232 depreciation)
Gain Recognized

Section 1245
Machine
$100,000

Section 1250
Building
$100,000

(32,768)
$67,232

(32,768)
$67,232

While the gains associated with the sale of both pieces of property are
equivalent, the character of these gains is not. The following chart
highlights these differences:
38
See H.R. REP. NO. 88-749, at 102–03 (1963) (“Your committee generally has limited the
depreciation recapture to the excess over straight line depreciation because it believes that only to this
extent could the depreciation taken appropriately be considered in excess of the decline in the value of
the property which occurs over time. If a gain still occurs, it is believed that this is attributable to a rise
in price levels generally rather than to an absence of a decline in the value of the property. The portion
representing the rise in value is comparable to other forms of gains which quite generally are treated as
capital gains. Moreover, your committee believes that when the property is held for an extended period
of time, gains realized on the sale or other disposition of the property are more likely to be attributable
to price rises generally than to an excess of depreciation deductions.”). The Senate Committee adopted
this view in substantially unchanged wording. See S. REP. NO. 88-830, at 133 (1964) for the adopted
language.
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Property
Total Gain Recognized
Recapture (Ordinary) Income
Balance Taxed Under § 1231

Section 1245
Machine
$67,232
67,232
-0-
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Section 1250
Building
$67,232
10,33939
$56,893

Assuming the tax rate on ordinary income is 40% and the capital gains
tax rate is 20%,40 the resulting tax consequences are quite different, as
demonstrated by the chart below.
Property
Tax on Recapture Income
Tax on § 1231 Income
Total Tax

Section 1245
Machine
$26,892.80
-0$26,892.80

Section 1250
Building
$4,135.60
11,379.60
$15,514.20

In percentage terms, the overall tax burden incurred on the sale of the
machinery is 73%41 higher than the tax burden on the sale of the building,
even though the taxpayer is in exactly the same economic position with
respect to each acquisition and sale.
Obviously, these differing tax burdens produce more favorable
treatment of real estate investments than of investments in other assets. To
that extent, it is equally clear that they diminish the potency of the lock-in
effect as to those tax-favored assets. Congress was apparently persuaded
that this was justified by the distinctive nature of real estate investments.42
More specifically, the legislative history articulates that personal property
generally tends to decline in value whereas real property generally tends to
increase in value;43 that being the case, Congress decided that as an
appreciating asset, akin to other capital investments, associated gains
should be accorded capital treatment, other than those gains associated
with accelerated depreciation deductions.44
39
Note that the “applicable percentage” taxable as ordinary income is 60% after the holdingperiod reduction, see supra note 8 and accompanying text, namely, 100% less 40% (months held in
excess of twenty).
40
Because the example is theoretical, not based on actual Code provisions applicable to any
particular year, we are using approximate tax rates that roughly re-create the rate structures applicable
in many recent tax years.
41
($26,892.80 – ($4,135.60 + $11,379.60)) / ($4,135.60 + $11,379.60).
42
See S. REP. NO. 88-830, at 132 (1964) (“Congress did not include real property in the recapture
provision applicable to depreciable personal property because it recognized the problem in doing so
where there is an appreciable rise in the value of real property attributable to a rise in the general price
level over a long period of time.”).
43
Id.
44
See id. (“The bill . . . takes this . . . into account [by] . . . mak[ing] sure that the ordinary income
treatment is applied upon the sale of the asset only to what may truly be called excess depreciation
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C. Evolution of § 1250 from Its Enactment to Its Current Status
During the ensuing five decades from its enactment in 1964, Congress
has made periodic reforms to the Code, some directly bearing upon § 1250
and others indirectly. These changes vary widely in their form and
significance.
In 1969, Congress decided that many real estate investments had
become de facto tax shelters. Accelerated depreciation, the use of leverage,
and the ten-year phaseout of § 1250 recapture income (which allowed
gains to be taxed at preferential capital tax rates)45 were effective—perhaps
overly so—in luring taxpayers to make tax-driven real estate investments.46
To remedy this problem, Congress tweaked § 1250: in the case of
nonresidential property, the ten-year phaseout period was eliminated (i.e.,
the accelerated portion of any depreciation deduction (in excess of straightline depreciation) would be recaptured as ordinary income regardless of the
duration of the owner’s tenure in that property);47 and in the case of
residential property, the ten-year phaseout period was elongated to sixteen
and two-thirds years, with the tapering-off period beginning one hundred
months after the real property in question was placed in service.48
Over the next two decades, § 1250 became marginally more stringent.
This is reflected in two separate pieces of legislation. First, as part of the
Tax Reform Act of 1976, except for certain low-income housing, the
recapture phaseout for § 1250 property was eliminated, so that all gains
associated with the difference between accelerated and straight-line
depreciation on residential real estate were made subject to recapture.49
Second, as part of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982,
Congress enacted § 291,50 which reduced the capital gains treatment
available for § 1250 property held by corporate taxpayers.51 Specifically,
§ 291 provided that in addition to whatever ordinary income § 1250 would
give rise to, corporate taxpayers would also have to recognize an additional
deductions. It does this first by providing that in no event is there to be a recapture of depreciation as
ordinary income where the property is sold at a gain except to the extent the depreciation deductions
taken exceed the deduction which would have been allowable had the taxpayer limited his deductions
to those available under the straight-line method of depreciation. Secondly, a provision has been added
which in any event tapers off the proportion of any gain which will be treated as ordinary income so
that it disappears gradually over a 10-year holding period for the real estate. As a result, under the bill,
no ordinary income will be realized on the sale of real estate held more than 10 years.”).
45
See supra text accompanying note 32.
46
See S. REP. NO. 91-552, at 212 (1969); H.R. REP. NO. 91-413, at 165 (1969).
47
I.R.C. § 1250(a)(2)(B)(ii) (1970). This legislation was enacted as part of the Tax Reform Act of
1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 521(b), 83 Stat. 487, 652–53.
48
I.R.C. § 1250(a)(1)(C)(iv) (1970).
49
Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 202(a)–(b), 90 Stat. 1520, 1527–30.
50
Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 204(a), 96 Stat. 324,
423–26.
51
I.R.C. § 291(a)(1) (1982).
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fifteen percent of the recognized gain as ordinary income on the portion of
the gain that § 1245 would have treated as ordinary income.52
Following these modest efforts to enhance the vigor of § 1250,
however, in the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Congress significantly curtailed
its revenue potency. Aside from equalizing the tax rates on ordinary
income and capital gains (which proved to be short-lived),53 Congress, as
part of the Code’s overhaul, introduced the Modified Accelerated Cost
Recovery System (MACRS).54 Under MACRS, all real property placed
into service after 1986 had to employ the straight-line depreciation
method.55 As a result of this reform, § 1250 recapture income, which by
definition depends on a mathematical difference between accelerated and
straight-line depreciation deductions, was effectively programmed to be
phased out of existence with two extraordinarily limited exceptions: real
property disposed of within one year of its acquisition56 and a narrow class
of § 1250 property (e.g., certain fifteen-year land improvements and sevenyear theme park structures).57 As all real property placed into service
before 1987 will now be fully depreciated (whether the taxpayer used an
accelerated or straight-line method),58 § 1250 recapture provisions have
been essentially rendered a nullity (i.e., the use of accelerated depreciation
is impermissible with respect to any real property acquired after 1986).59
52
Id. As part of the Tax Reform Act of 1984, Congress increased this percentage from 15% to
20%. Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 68(a), 98 Stat. 494, 588.
53
Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 301(b)(2), 100 Stat. 2085, 2217 (codified at
I.R.C. § 172(d)(2) (1988)). This legislative change made the recapture of prior depreciation deductions
no more financially onerous than the recognition of capital gains (i.e., both kinds of income endured the
same tax rates). However, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 reinstituted the rate
differential between ordinary income and capital gains, once again making the latter more financially
attractive than the former. Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 11101(c), 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-404 to -405 (codified
at I.R.C. § 1 (1994)).
54
Tax Reform Act of 1986 §§ 201(a), 203(a)(1)(a).
55
I.R.C. §§ 168(b)(3), 1250(b)(1) (1988).
56
Id. § 1250(b)(1). Note that due to the high transaction costs associated with the transfer of real
estate (e.g., financing expenses, legal fees, and realty transfer taxes), real estate is rarely purchased and
subsequently sold within a one-year time span.
57
Id. § 168(e); see also Rev. Proc. 87-56, 1987-2 C.B. 674, modified and clarified, Rev. Proc. 8822, 1988-1 C.B. 785.
58
In 1986, prior to the MACRS straight-line depreciation mandate in 1987, a nineteen-year class
life was the longest depreciation period available for real estate. See Simplification of General Imputed
Interest Rules Act of 1985, Pub. L. 99-121, § 103(a), 99 Stat. 505, 509 (codified at I.R.C. § 168
(1988)); see also Daley v. Comm’r, 62 T.C.M. (CCH) 1197, 1201 (1991) (“The recovery period for
real property placed in service after May 8, 1985, and before January 1, 1987, was 19 years.”).
59
The Treasury regulations instruct that when comparing accelerated depreciation results with
straight-line results, the comparison must include results that would have been produced “if
depreciation had actually been determined under the straight line method throughout the period the
property was held.” Treas. Reg. § 1.1250-2(b)(3)(i) (2015). The Treasury regulations add that “[s]uch
useful life . . . shall be determined by taking into account for each taxable year the same facts and
circumstances as would have been taken into account if the taxpayer had used such method throughout
the period the property was held.” Id. § 1.1250-2(b)(3)(ii).
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The last small injection of life into § 1250 occurred approximately one
decade later. In the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, in the context of a
general reform of capital gains provisions, Congress decided that the
“unrecaptured” § 1250 income (i.e., the portion of gain related to the prior
straight-line depreciation deductions) should be subject to its own unique
tax rate.60 With respect to unrecaptured § 1250 gain, Congress chose a tax
rate between the ordinary income tax rate and the capital gains tax rate,
which then and now equals 25%.61
***
This historic trajectory indicates that, compared to its § 1245
counterpart, § 1250 recapture was feeble at inception, gained a little
strength (but not much) in subsequent tax reform efforts, and has been all
but repealed by the passage of time since the Tax Reform Act of 1986
eliminated accelerated depreciation for real estate.
To illustrate, consider again the situation of a taxpayer who purchases
and places into service a piece of machinery and a building, each for
$100,000, but this time in 2015. For pedagogical reasons, assume that both
the machinery and the building each have a ten-year useful life, neither the
mid-year nor mid-month conventions apply, the taxpayer elects to use the
straight-line depreciation method for the machinery,62 and, in accordance
with the Code, uses the straight-line method for the building.63
The following table illustrates the taxpayer’s depreciation deductions
for each asset as well as each asset’s adjusted tax basis at year’s end:
Year
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
Total

Depreciation
$10,000
$10,000
$10,000
$10,000
$10,000
$50,000

Adjusted
Tax Basis
$90,000
$80,000
$70,000
$60,000
$50,000

Suppose that at the end of 2019 the taxpayer sells both the machinery
and the building for $100,000. The resulting gains would be as follows:

60

Pub. L. No. 105–34, § 31, 111 Stat. 831, 833 (codified at I.R.C. § 1(h) (2000)).
I.R.C. § 1(h)(1)(E) (2012).
62
Id. § 1250(b)(5); Treas. Reg. § 1.1250-2(b)(3) (2015).
63
Treas. Reg. § 1.1250-2(b)(3).
61
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Amount Realized
Less Adjusted Basis
($100,000 cost less
$50,000 depreciation)
Gain
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Section 1245
Machine
$100,000

Section 1250
Building
$100,000

(50,000)
$50,000

(50,000)
$50,000

While the gains associated with the sale of both pieces of property are
equivalent (i.e., $50,000 gain recognized), the character of these gains
yields substantial advantages for the real estate investment. The following
chart highlights these differences:
Property
Recapture Income
Unrecaptured Income

Section 1245
Machine
$50,000
$0

Section 1250
Building
$0
$50,000

Assuming that the ordinary income tax rate is 40%, the capital gains
tax rate is 20%, and the unrecaptured § 1250 tax rate is 25%, the tax
outcomes, as reflected in the chart below, are vastly different.
Property
Tax on Recapture Income
Tax on Unrecaptured Income
Total Tax

Section 1245
Machine
$20,000
-0$20,000

Section 1250
Building
$0
12,500
$12,500

In percentage terms, the overall tax burden that befalls the machinery is
60%64 higher than the tax burden that befalls the sale of the building even
though the taxpayer is in exactly the same economic position with respect
to each acquisition.
In Part III, we examine whether Congress’s theoretical foundation in
establishing § 1250 was on solid footing when it distinguished between
personal property and real property and, moreover, whether the
implementation of those provisions was correctly handled.
III. ANALYSIS OF § 1250
In deciding whether § 1250 merits retention, we analyze this question
from several different vantage points. First, in Part III.A, we argue that
§ 1250 subverts both the tax benefit rule and the duty of consistency.
64

($20,000 – $12,500) / $12,500.
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Second, in Part III.B, we assert that there are insufficient differences
between personal property and real property to justify dramatically
different tax outcomes inuring to each. Finally, in Part III.C, we
demonstrate that § 1250, in its present form, produces inequitable
outcomes, discriminating in favor of those taxpayers who are in the highest
tax brackets.
A. Section 1250 Subverts Both the Tax Benefit Rule and the Duty of
Consistency
Neither the tax benefit rule nor the duty of consistency is codified.
They are instead founded on equitable principles and have been carefully
assembled and refined by judges over the long history of the federal
income tax. In the two parts below, we explore how § 1250 subverts them.
1. Section 1250 Contravenes the Tax Benefit Rule
The tax benefit rule is an amalgamation of numerous court cases.65
Succinctly put, it posits that if taxpayers obtain a tax benefit in one tax year
based on facts as known in that year, but find in a subsequent year that
further developments are fundamentally inconsistent with allowance of the
earlier tax benefit, then in that subsequent year a corrective inclusion in
income must be made to offset the earlier benefit.66 For close to a century,
this rule has been an integral part of the Code’s fabric,67 seeking to ensure
equity. The IRS has invoked the tax benefit rule in a wide range of
applications, attesting to its broad applicability.68
A simple example will illustrate how the tax benefit rule applies.
Suppose in Year 1 that Taxpayer A, which is in the banking business, loans
$100,000 to Taxpayer B. The loan is for a ten-year period, interest
payments are due annually, and the principal is to be paid entirely at the
65
See Wm. D. Elliott, The Tax Benefit Rule: A Common Law of Recapture, 39 SW. L.J. 845, 857
(1985) (stating that more recent interpretations of the tax benefit rule give the IRS more power than did
previous interpretations); William T. Plumb, Jr., The Tax Benefit Rule Today, 57 HARV. L. REV. 129,
132–33 (1943) (discussing the rule’s historic development); Charles W. Tye, The Tax Benefit Doctrine
Reexamined, 3 TAX L. REV. 329, 329–30 (1948) (noting that the Supreme Court narrowly construed the
tax benefit rule in the early twentieth century).
66
Hillsboro Nat’l Bank v. Comm’r, 460 U.S. 370, 381–82 (1983) (outlining the most recent
comprehensive elaboration of the tax benefit rule by the Supreme Court); see also Boris I. Bittker &
Stephen B. Kanner, The Tax Benefit Rule, 26 UCLA L. REV. 265, 267–71 (1978) (explaining that to
accurately reflect income, taxpayers must make adjustments during the year of the recovery if it is
found that the earlier deduction was unnecessary).
67
Treas. Reg. 62, art. 51 (1922) (noting that the collection of previously written-off debt must be
included in income); Treas. Reg. 33, art. 125 (1914) (same).
68
See, e.g., Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 402 (stating that Congress intended that the same construction
of the tax benefit rule apply in various contexts); Thomas J. Mahoney, Jr., Note, The Tax Benefit Rule
After Hillsboro, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 362, 377–82 (1986) (detailing the various contexts in which
the tax benefit rule may be applicable).
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maturity of the loan, without amortization. There is, however, an
acceleration clause that calls for repayment of the principal in the event of
default on the obligation to pay interest. In Year 3, Taxpayer B defaults on
his interest payment. This triggers the acceleration clause, on which the
debtor also defaults. After failing to collect the note’s principal in Year 4,
Taxpayer A takes a $100,000 business bad debt deduction. But if in any
subsequent year Taxpayer B experiences a reversal of fortune and repays
his debt to Taxpayer A, Taxpayer A must, pursuant to the tax benefit rule,
treat Taxpayer B’s repayment as income in the year of repayment, in the
same amount and character as it had deducted—in this case, $100,000 of
ordinary income.
It can be readily seen that, in the absence of statutory direction to the
contrary, the tax benefit rule might well apply to depreciable asset
deductions. In Year 1, Taxpayer A places a $100,000 asset into service in
his trade or business and begins to take $10,000 annual depreciation
deductions; these deductions offset Taxpayer A’s taxable income, thereby
producing a bona fide tax benefit. Ten years and $100,000 of depreciation
deductions later, Taxpayer A is nevertheless able to sell this asset for
$100,000, producing a $100,000 gain (i.e., $100,000 – $0). In retrospect,
assuming depreciation deductions are supposed to reflect an asset’s decline
in value,69 the depreciation deductions appear to have been unwarranted
(akin to reporting the bad debt deduction in the prior example). A
straightforward application of the tax benefit rule in this context would
require that Taxpayer A report the sale proceeds in the same amount and
character as he had deducted—to wit, $100,000 of ordinary income.
However, that approach was not generally sought by the IRS in
litigation prior to the enactment of § 1250; and, following enactment, that
approach could be said to be foreclosed by the provision of contrary
statutory rules for handling the sale of depreciated assets. In conjunction
with § 1016, § 1001 yields the appropriate amount of gain ($100,000) but
does not preserve the appropriate character of that gain. Instead, the prior
depreciation deductions are categorized as § 1231 gains, subject to a 25%
preferential capital gains tax rate, approximately 37% less than the
potential 39.6% tax rate applicable to ordinary income. The tax benefits
that the taxpayer obtained, which are subsequently revealed to have been

69
Admittedly, over the last several decades, depreciation deductions, particularly those of an
accelerated nature, have served other agendas such as spurring economic growth. See Simon v.
Comm’r, 68 F.3d 41, 44–45 (2d Cir. 1995), for an alternative application. But depreciation schedules
nevertheless remain calibrated to reflect an asset’s decline in value. See, e.g., Clinger v. Comm’r, 60
T.C.M. (CCH) 598, 600 (1990) (“[W]here respondent has determined that a taxpayer’s assets have no
determinable useful life and consequently are not depreciable, petitioner must establish that an asset
used in a trade or business has a determinable useful life and prove the class of recovery property to
which it is assigned.”).
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excessive, are only partially offset by the § 1250 gain.
2. Section 1250 Violates the Duty of Consistency

The tax benefit rule shares close kinship with the duty of consistency,
which likewise is not codified and which also has deep equitable roots.
Succinctly stated, this duty declares that a taxpayer cannot take a position
one year on a tax return and, after the statute of limitations has lapsed with
respect to it, take an inconsistent position on a later tax return.71 For many
decades, the duty of consistency has been judicially sanctioned72 and
applied in a variety of situations.73
Cogent articulations of the duty of consistency are found in McMillan
v. United States74 and Beltzer v. United States.75 These two court decisions
posit three conditions that, if met, prevent taxpayers from taking a tax
position in a subsequent tax year that is inconsistent with reporting for a
previous tax year.
These three conditions are as follows:
1. The taxpayer has made a representation of fact or reported an item
for tax purposes in one tax year.
2. The Service has acquiesced to or relied on that fact for that year.
3. The taxpayer desires to change the representation made in a later
tax year after the first year has been closed by the statute of
limitations.76
The duty of consistency may apply even when the subsequent
inconsistent reporting is made by a different party with an interest in the
same transaction or representation. In Hess v. United States,77 for example,
a decedent’s executor submitted a federal estate tax return that reported the
putative value of several of the estate’s assets; presumably to minimize the
70

H.R. REP. NO. 88-749, at 102–03 (1963).
See Michael E. Baillif, The Return Consistency Rule: A Proposal for Resolving the SubstanceForm Debate, 48 TAX LAW. 289, 291 (1995) (listing three elements of taxpayer duty of consistency);
Steve R. Johnson, The Taxpayer’s Duty of Consistency, 46 TAX L. REV. 537, 549 (1991) (same).
72
In past years, some courts have mistakenly labeled the duty of consistency “estoppel,” see, e.g.,
Joyce v. Gentsch, 141 F.2d 891, 896 (6th Cir. 1944), or “quasi-estoppel,” see, e.g., Cattle Co. v. United
States, 79-1 U.S.T.C. (CCH) 86,616 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
73
See Johnson, supra note 71, at 537 (“A hallmark of the duty is flexibility. It has been applied to
prevent taxpayers from taking inconsistent positions in order to exclude from all tax periods income
that clearly is taxable in some period, deduct the same expense in two or more periods, improperly
inflate the basis of an asset, convert one type of income into a different, tax-favored type and profit
from other sorts of tax abuses.” (citations omitted)).
74
64-2 U.S.T.C. (CCH) 93,836 (S.D. W. Va. 1964).
75
495 F.2d 211 (8th Cir. 1974).
76
See McMillan, 64-2 U.S.T.C. at 93,838–40.
77
537 F.2d 457 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
71

.
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amount of the estate tax due, the executor of the decedent’s estate chose to
report the lowest defensible fair market value of these assets.78 For
purposes of computing subsequent gains/losses, however, these reported
values had the effect of establishing the tax basis of these assets.79 After
the statute of limitations closed with respect to the decedent’s estate tax
return, one of the estate’s beneficiaries claimed that the estate had
undervalued one of the decedent’s assets and that a higher value—yielding
a higher basis in that beneficiary’s hands—should have been reported. That
higher value would have produced a larger estate tax, of course, but by the
time of the sale of the asset by the beneficiary, the estate was closed and
the statute of limitations for reopening it had long passed. In analyzing the
legitimacy of the taxpayer’s position, the Federal Claims Court held that
because all three conditions of the duty of consistency were met,80 the
estate’s beneficiary was bound by the tax return position reported by the
estate’s executor.
The duty of consistency could arguably apply to depreciable asset
deductions in the following manner: in Year 1, Taxpayer A places a
$100,000 asset into service in his trade or business and begins to take
$10,000 annual depreciation deductions, thereby reducing both his taxable
income81 and the asset’s tax basis.82 Ten years and $100,000 of
depreciation deductions later, the asset’s tax basis would have been
reduced to $0. Suppose, however, that Taxpayer A is nevertheless able to
sell this asset for $100,000, producing a $100,000 gain (i.e., $100,000 –
$0). Because depreciation deductions are intended to reflect an asset’s
decline in value,83 the depreciation deductions appear to have been wholly
unwarranted and the asset’s tax basis should have remained unchanged.
Because the statute of limitations is closed in the early years of asset
ownership,84 however, it would be impossible for the IRS to demand
upward income adjustments for all of the asset ownership years in
question.
In this situation, all three conditions for the duty of consistency are
78
Id. at 459–61; see also I.R.C. § 2031(a) (2012) (“The value of the gross estate of the decedent
shall be determined by . . . the value at the time of his death of all property, real or personal, tangible or
intangible . . . .”).
79
See I.R.C. § 1014(a) (2012) (detailing the way in which the tax basis of property acquired from
a decedent is determined).
80
See Hess, 537 F.2d at 463 (“First, the taxpayer must have made a representation or reported an
item for tax purposes in one year; second, the Commissioner must have acquiesced or relied on that
fact for that year; and third, the taxpayer must desire to change the representation, previously made, in
a later year after the statute of limitations on assessment bars adjustment for the initial years.”).
81
The deduction is allowed pursuant to § 167(a), in an amount computed according to the rules of
§ 168(a).
82
I.R.C. § 1016(a)(2) (2012).
83
See sources cited supra note 2.
84
See I.R.C. § 6501(a) (2012).
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theoretically met:
1. The taxpayer took $10,000 of depreciation deductions, which
correspondingly reduced the asset’s tax basis.
2. The IRS acquiesced to this fact.
3. Ten years later (after the majority of tax years in question have
been closed), the taxpayer is essentially asserting that (i) over the
tenure of asset ownership, the depreciation deductions were too
generous; and (ii) as a result, the asset’s tax basis is too low,
yielding “overstated” gain that should therefore be accorded
preferential tax rate treatment.
But the duty of consistency would demand that the taxpayer live with
his prior reporting choices. What this means is that since the taxpayer
chose to report generous depreciation deductions that produced ordinary
income tax deductions, the quid pro quo of taking these generous
deductions requires that the taxpayer report any subsequent gains
associated with such asset’s disposition as ordinary income.
***
These two prior subparts demonstrate some tension between § 1250
and the judicially crafted equity principles of the tax benefit rule and the
duty of consistency. Of course, judicial tax principles, unless grounded in
constitutional considerations, must yield to congressional enactments. For
example, the judicially formulated assignment of income doctrine85—
which taxes income to the service provider rather than to those taxpayers to
whom he assigns it86—yields to §§ 351 and 721, which permit accounts
receivable attributable to service income to be assigned tax free to the
business entity and reported by it rather than to the actual service
provider.87 This result makes sense: Congress wants to promote business
formation even if it comes at the possible expense of the assignment of
income doctrine, the application of which might otherwise impede business
development.
85
See Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114–15 (1930) (determining that an income tax cannot be
avoided by anticipatory arrangements preventing the income to vest in the person who earned it); see
also Comm’r v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260, 264 (1958) (finding that the assignment of a payment
right is taxable as ordinary income). For a general overview of this doctrine and its application, see
Charles S. Lyon & James S. Eustice, Assignment of Income: Fruit and Tree as Irrigated by the P.G.
Lake Case, 17 TAX L. REV. 293 (1962) and James S. Eustice, Contract Rights, Capital Gain, and
Assignment of Income—The Ferrer Case, 20 TAX L. REV. 1 (1964).
86
Comm’r v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 739–40 (1949).
87
See, e.g., Schneer v. Comm’r, 97 T.C. 643, 657–58 (1991) (reasoning that the assignment of
income doctrine must yield to the policy objectives sought to be achieved by § 721).
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It must be admitted that the tax benefit rule and the duty of consistency
yield to the provisions of § 1250, just as the assignment of income doctrine
yields to §§ 351 and 751. In the case of § 1250, however, Congress offered
no compelling case that the equitable principles embodied in the tax
benefit rule and the duty of consistency be relegated or ignored. Instead,
Congress unduly circumscribed the scope of § 1250 in reliance on
unsubstantiated claims proffered by the real estate industry.88
As the next Part demonstrates, Congress not only failed to offer
compelling justifications to override the tax benefit rule and the duty of
consistency, but also drew false distinctions between personal property and
real property in crafting the provisions of §§ 1245 and 1250.
B. The Code’s Distinction Between “Section 1245 Property” and “Section
1250 Property” Lacks Merit
As noted previously, the Code draws a fundamental distinction
between the tax treatment upon disposition of personal property (i.e., §
1245 property) and the tax treatment upon disposition of commercial and
residential buildings and the structural components thereof (i.e., § 1250
property). A bit more detail on the distinctions among those categories of
property will be helpful.
The Treasury Department has promulgated regulations that amplify the
meaning of three salient terms: (i) personal property, (ii) building, and (iii)
structural components. The Treasury regulations define the phrase
personal property89 referred to in § 124590 to mean “any tangible property
except land and improvements thereto, such as buildings or other
inherently permanent structures (including items which are structural
components of such buildings or structures).”91 The Treasury regulations
then amplify the meaning of the terms building and structural components:
The term “building” generally means any structure or edifice
enclosing a space within its walls, and usually covered by a
roof, the purpose of which is, for example, to provide shelter
or housing, or to provide working, office, parking, display, or
sales space. . . .
. . . The term “structural components” includes such parts of
a building as walls, partitions, floors, and ceilings, as well as
88
See supra note 34 and accompanying text (noting that members of the homebuilding industry
exerted substantial efforts to influence the effect of § 1250).
89
Treas. Reg. § 1.1245-3(b)(1) (2015) defines personal property as “(1) [t]angible personal
property (as defined in paragraph (c) of § 1.48-1, relating to the definition of ‘section 38 property’ for
purposes of the investment credit).”
90
I.R.C. § 1245(a)(3)(A) (2012).
91
Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(c) (2015).
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any permanent coverings therefor such as paneling or tiling;
window and doors; all components (whether in, on, or
adjacent to the building) of a central air conditioning or
heating system, including motors, compressors, pipes and
ducts, plumbing and plumbing fixtures, such as sinks and
bathtubs; electric wiring and lighting fixtures; chimneys;
stairs, escalators, and elevators, including all components
thereof; sprinkler systems; fire escapes; and other
components relating to the operation or maintenance of a
building.92
While these definitions are critical to help taxpayers and the IRS
ascertain how to classify property for depreciation purposes,93 they offer no
compelling rationale as to why, when it comes to asset dispositions,
Congress grants more favorable tax treatment to taxable gains related to
one property classification than the other. All assets are subject to forces
that tend to inflate their value, including but not limited to resource
scarcity,94 population growth,95 and the monetary policy set by the U.S.
Federal Reserve.96 Simultaneously, however, there are competing forces
92

Id. § 1.48-1(e)(1), (2).
For close to two decades, taxpayers and the IRS have adjudicated numerous cases over proper
property classification. These battles typically arise in the following context: taxpayers purchase or
construct a building and, to avoid subjecting the entire purchase price or construction costs to long-term
depreciation periods (e.g., 27.5 and 39 years), they seek, through a process known as “cost
segregation,” to identify certain components of the building (e.g., carpeting) that are subject to shorter
depreciation schedules. See, e.g., AmeriSouth XXXII, Ltd. v. Comm’r, 103 T.C.M. 1324, 1325 (2012)
(holding that a taxpayer could not segregate apartment fixtures, such as kitchen sinks, from the building
at large, which was depreciable over 27.5 years); Hosp. Corp. of Am. v. Comm’r, 109 T.C. 21, 25
(1997) (determining that a taxpayer could not depreciate functionally or structurally related property
items apart from a hospital, which was to be depreciated over thirty-nine years). Upon audit, the IRS
typically challenges this process on the basis that the components that the taxpayer has identified are
actual structural components of the building and thus do not qualify for shorter depreciation schedules.
See, e.g., Metro Nat’l Corp. v. Comm’r, 52 T.C.M. 1440, 1442 (1987) (reviewing the Commissioner’s
determination that outside lighting was a structural component of a medical building and could not be
depreciated on a different schedule than that building).
94
See Robert M. Solow, The Economics of Resources or the Resources of Economics, 64 AM.
ECON. REV. 1, 3 (1974) (explaining the relationship between the demand for or use of a resource and its
market price).
95
See Edward L. Glaeser et al., Housing Supply and Housing Bubbles, 64 J. URB. ECON. 198, 199
(2008) (discussing the interchange between population growth and housing bubbles).
96
See Ben S. Bernanke, Deflation: Making Sure “It” Doesn’t Happen Here, FED. RES. BOARD
(Nov. 21, 2002), http://www.federalreserve.gov/BoardDocs/speeches/2002/20021121/ [http://perma.cc/
ZNS2-ETSN] (“Since World War II, inflation—the apparently inexorable rise in the prices of goods
and services—has been the bane of central bankers.”). In Treasury Department studies, the department
has found that several categories of depreciable property increased in value over time. See, e.g.,
DEPRECIATION ANALYSIS DIV., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON THE
DEPRECIATION OF FRUIT AND NUT TREES 21 (1990), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/taxpolicy/Documents/depreci8study_fruitnuttrees.pdf [http://perma.cc/2YZR-TCHP]; DEPRECIATION
ANALYSIS DIV., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON THE DEPRECIATION OF
93
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that act upon physical assets that tend to depress their value, such as wear
and tear and technological obsolescence.97 In most cases, these diminishing
forces generally outweigh the appreciating forces, causing overall property
values gradually to decline. 98
Insofar as the foregoing proposition is concerned, it may or may not be
true for real estate. Nevertheless, its veracity hardly matters for purposes of
designing appropriate recapture rules. Indeed, if the value of real estate
typically does not decline over time, that is an argument against allowing
any depreciation at all, not an argument for a more generous depreciation
recapture rule. Without a compelling rationale, Congress should not draw
artificial distinctions among property classifications. It is true that some
component of the gain on any asset sale may be related to inflation in
general price levels. But if Congress deems it appropriate under such
circumstances to grant nominal gains preferential tax treatment,99 then such
treatment should be universal across property classifications. Any other
approach is arbitrary and distorts economic decision making.
C. As Presently Designed, § 1250 Is Inequitable
A generally unnoticed aspect of § 1250 is that it systematically favors
high-bracket taxpayers.
An example demonstrates this point. Consider two taxpayers who
invest in real estate. Taxpayer A has $1.3 million of taxable income, part of
which is attributable to the sale of a building she had purchased for $4.5
million. She claimed $300,000 of depreciation during her ownership of the
building and subsequently sold it for $5 million, thereby producing an
$800,000 gain ($5,000,000 – $4,200,000). This $800,000 gain would have
two character components: (i) $500,000 of § 1231 gain and (ii) $300,000
of § 1250 unrecaptured gain. On Schedule D of her tax return (which
pertains to the computation of capital gains and losses), A would owe
$100,000 of tax on the § 1231 gain ($500,000 x 20% capital gains tax rate)
and $75,000 of tax on the § 1250 unrecaptured gain ($300,000 x 25%
HORSES 23–24 (1990), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/depreci8study
_horses.pdf [http://perma.cc/W2F6-KZPL].
97
E.g., Liddle v. Comm’r, 103 T.C. 285, 289 (1994) (stating that the annual allocation of
depreciation represents the wear and tear incurred over the year); Simon v. Comm’r, 103 T.C. 247, 253
(1994) (identifying the annual allocation for depreciation as a means of compensating for wear and tear
incurred during that period).
98
See, e.g., Jeff Strnad, Tax Depreciation and Risk, 52 SMU L. REV. 547, 547 (1999) (“A major
issue under an accretion tax is how to treat depreciable assets, assets that tend to decline in value with
time and use.”).
99
For one article discussing the arguments surrounding this possibility, see Noel B. Cunningham
& Deborah H. Schenk, The Case for a Capital Gains Preference, 48 TAX L. REV. 319, 337 (1993)
(“One of the principal arguments used to support the preference is that capital gains are largely
inflationary.”).
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§ 1250 unrecaptured tax rate). On both components of the gain, A enjoys a
tax rate reduction relative to the ordinary income tax rate—namely,
39.6%100—that might otherwise bear upon her income.
In contrast, consider Taxpayer B, who has $30,000 of taxable income,
part of which is attributable to the sale of a building she had purchased for
$200,000. She claimed $15,000 of depreciation while she held this
building and then sold it for $205,000, thereby producing a $20,000 gain
($205,000 – $185,000). This $20,000 gain would have two character
components: (i) $5,000 of § 1231 gain and (ii) $15,000 of unrecaptured
§ 1250 gain. On Schedule D of her tax return, B would owe $0 of tax on
the § 1231 gain ($5,000 x 0% capital gains tax rate) but $2,046 of tax on
the § 1250 unrecaptured gain of $15,000 (($4,075 x 10%) + ($10,925 x
15%)).101 This outcome produces no particular tax advantages for B
because the unrecaptured § 1250 gain is not taxed at a preferential tax rate
relative to the ordinary income tax rate.
The differences between the two taxpayers are the systematic result of
the fact that there is a substantial spread between the otherwise applicable
tax rate for high-bracket taxpayers (39.6%) and the unrecaptured § 1250
gain rate that applies to such taxpayers (25%). Lower-bracket taxpayers do
not enjoy any spread at all since their applicable unrecaptured § 1250 gain
rate is the same as their ordinary tax rate. The spread afforded to highbracket taxpayers creates a tax-arbitrage opportunity that is diminished as
the tax bracket of the taxpayer descends to 35%, 33%, and 28%—and
finally disappears altogether for taxpayers at or below the 25% bracket.
The following table summarizes the value of the arbitrage
opportunities available to taxpayers in varying marginal income tax
brackets in terms of the percentage of tax savings compared to the
otherwise applicable ordinary income tax rate for that taxpayer.

100
I.R.C. § 1 (2012). This income tax rate will be imposed upon Taxpayer A no matter her filing
status. See id. § 1(a)–(d). (listing possible income tax filing classifications and corresponding tax rates).
101
Id. § 1(h)(1)(E).
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Percentage Reduction
in Applicable
Tax Rate102
36.9%
28.6%
24.2%
10.7%
0%

It is difficult to imagine a justification for such noxious favoritism—
and, indeed, to our knowledge, none has ever been offered.
IV. REFORM OPPORTUNITIES
The case against § 1250’s retention in its present state seems
compelling. The situation is ripe for reform. Congress has several options
at its disposal. Four possible candidates include (i) repealing § 1250 and
expanding the scope of § 1245, (ii) making the § 1250 tax rate more
graduated, (iii) raising the § 1250 tax rate generally, or (iv) improving
depreciation rules.
A. Repeal § 1250 and Expand the Scope of § 1245
For the last half century, § 1245 has functioned efficiently and with
little controversy. Taxpayers generally know and understand the protocol:
depreciation deductions that give rise to ordinary deductions may
subsequently trigger ordinary income when and if such assets are sold at a
gain. This approach toward income characterization is equitable, simple,
and economically nondistortive; in addition, this approach is consistent
with the policy objective of eliminating the potential tax-arbitrage
advantage outlined in this analysis’s introduction.103
Given § 1245’s merits, Congress should expand its application to the
disposition of real property. This is not a radical reform measure. To the
contrary, taxpayers are familiar with the concept of recapture and are
102
The figures in the right column are derived in the following two-step process: first, we take the
difference between the applicable marginal tax rate versus the preferential tax rate; second, we divide
this difference by the otherwise applicable marginal rate. For example, in the top bracket, the
applicable marginal tax rate is 39.6%, and the preferential tax rate is 25%; step one is to take the
difference between these percentages, or 14.6 (39.6 – 25), and step two is to divide that difference by
39.6, which yields a rate discount of 36.9% (14.6 / 39.6).
103
For a contrary view, see Douglas A. Kahn, Accelerated Depreciation—Tax Expenditure or
Proper Allowance for Measuring Net Income?, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1, 48 (1979) (“In our current
economy, much of the [§ 1245] gain will be attributable to inflation if the owner has held the asset for
more than a few years. To tax inflationary gain at all is very close to a tax on capital, and to tax it at
ordinary income rates is especially harsh.”).
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sometimes surprised to learn that its application does not extend to the
disposition of real property. The contemplated reform would engender two
Code adjustments: (i) the repeal of § 1250 and (ii) an expansion of the
definition of § 1245 property104 to include commercial and residential
buildings and their components. Were Congress to make these
adjustments, neither it nor the IRS would have to engage in a mass
education campaign; business taxpayers already know how § 1245 applies
and would readily understand its expansion to include real estate.
Aside from improving equity, reducing complexity, eliminating a
source of economic distortion, and curbing tax arbitrage, there is a
serendipitous bonus associated with this reform approach: it can add
substantial sums to the Treasury’s coffers. Based upon a review of tax
years 2009 to 2012, if § 1250 unrecaptured gains were taxed at the highest
ordinary income tax rate (i.e., 39.6%) rather than the § 1250 unrecaptured
gain tax rate (i.e., 25%), then the Treasury would stand to gain as much as
$6.5 billion more annually in revenue.105 This dollar figure is not mere
pocket change; depending on political will, such additional revenue could
be used to reduce taxes, diminish the deficit, and/or expand social
programs.
B. Make the § 1250 Tax Rate More Graduated
Unrecaptured § 1250 gains are currently taxed at graduated tax rates,
up to a point.106 But at fairly low dollar thresholds (e.g., in 2014, for a
single taxpayer, $36,900), the application of lower tax rates is inapplicable
to § 1250 unrecaptured gains.107 Put slightly differently, all gains earned
above this fairly low dollar threshold are taxed at a flat 25% tax rate.
Insofar as the tax treatment of § 1250 unrecaptured income is concerned,
as an earlier example set forth in this analysis demonstrated,108 this rate
structure provides high-bracket taxpayers an undeserved arbitrage
opportunity.
One possible way to ameliorate this inequity would be to make the
§ 1250 tax rate structure more progressive. This could be accomplished by
adding new graduated tax rates to § 1250 unrecaptured gains. Of course,
the ideal form of the new graduated rates would simply replicate the
otherwise applicable ordinary income tax rates, in which case this solution
104

I.R.C. § 1245(a)(3) (2012).
See Richard L. Schmalbeck & Jay A. Soled, Reforming Real Estate Depreciation Recapture,
2015 TAX NOTES TODAY 887, 889–93 (making revenue estimates associated with this reform measure
that total $65 billion over a ten-year revenue-scoring period).
106
I.R.C. § 1(h)(1)(E) (2012).
107
Id.
108
See supra note 85 and accompanying text (discussing the paucity of meaningful policy
objectives for §§ 1245 and 1250 in comparison to other sections of the Internal Revenue Code).
105
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would be identical to the previous suggestion. However, if Congress
wished to compromise on this issue, it could select a rate structure that
provided some break for unrecaptured § 1250 gain, but in a manner that
provided more or less consistent percentage reductions for taxpayers in all
brackets. While this reform measure would not eliminate the tax burden
disparities between high- and low-income taxpayers, it would lessen the
tax-arbitrage advantages that currently inure primarily to high-income
taxpayers.
C. Raise the § 1250 Tax Rate Generally
For the past two decades, the § 1250 tax rate has remained at 25%
despite the fact that the general § 1(h) capital gains tax rate was raised in
2012 from 15% to 20% for taxpayers in the highest bracket.109 Consistent
with this general capital gains tax rate increase, another option for
Congress to consider is raising the § 1250 tax rate by a similar proportion,
from 25% to 33%.
D. Improve Depreciation Rules
Of course, a fourth approach that would be highly desirable would be
to adjust depreciation rules broadly so that they better tracked the actual
decline in asset values over time. It would no doubt be impossible to craft
depreciation rules that would accomplish this perfectly, but Congress could
certainly do better than it has. Specific suggestions to that end are beyond
the scope of this analysis, but it should be kept in mind that the extent of
the tax-arbitrage problem inherent in § 1250 is directly related to the
inaccuracy of current depreciation rules. Put differently, if real estate
depreciation deductions better reflected actual losses in asset values, then
the stakes involved in the recapture rules would diminish proportionately.
V. CONCLUSION
The ubiquitous use of § 1250 cannot be overstated. Millions of
taxpayers own depreciable real estate, which they periodically sell or
exchange, triggering § 1250’s application. Despite its ubiquity, § 1250 has
never achieved its purported objective of accurately recapturing excess
depreciation deductions.110 Instead, it continues to enable high-income
taxpayers who invest in depreciable real estate to achieve a unique Codesanctioned tax-arbitrage advantage.
Congress should reform this area of the law. Our strong preference,
109
See American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, 126 Stat. 2313, 2318
(codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.) (raising the capital gains tax rate from 15% to 20% on
high-income taxpayers).
110
Polito, supra note 2, at 93.
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and our suggestion to Congress, is that it should eliminate § 1250 and
expand the application of § 1245. Were Congress to repeal § 1250 and
make the application of § 1245 universal, it would eliminate tax arbitrage
related to depreciation deductions. This would produce across-the-board
equitable results. Other options are available, along the lines of tinkering
with the rate structure for unrecaptured § 1250 gains. However, such halfhearted measures would only reduce, but not eliminate, the inappropriate
tax-arbitrage opportunities that the present rules afford to high-bracket
taxpayers.
If this analysis indicates nothing else, one thing should be abundantly
clear: retaining the status quo is unacceptable. A half-century is too long
for Congress to allow a significant inequity to be perpetuated; waiting
another fifty years to institute reforms would be truly shameful.

